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'They must not call us warlords,' 
says Badshah Khan, leaning forward. 
'If you call us warlords, we will kill you.'1
It is with a great deal of fondness that I dedicate this offering to David Silverman, who reigned 
as my own powerful, yet benevolent warlord for a period of eight years or so during the 1990’s. 
David fought fiercely on behalf of his students, which is something that all afforded his protec-
tion and pedagogy appreciated greatly.
Several years ago, in an effort to learn more about life in war-torn Afghanistan, I pur-
chased a copy of The Bookseller of Kabul by Åsne Seierstad.  The narrative focuses on events 
in the life of the family that she lived with in Kabul in 2002, just following the retreat 
of the Taliban.  In one chapter, however, the action veers seventy or so miles away to the 
wild, mountainous borderlands that separate Afghanistan from Pakistan. Seierstad writes of 
encountering a powerful warlord while shadowing a journalist covering Operation Anaconda, 
the U.S. military’s major offensive against Taliban remnants in southeastern Afghanistan.  I 
will quote the following passage at length, as it evoked for me a strong sense of déjà vu 
and one of those wonderful—and admittedly uncommon—sensations that the gap of more 
than three millennia that separates current affairs from those of the Late Bronze Age is not 
entirely insurmountable.  The past is indeed a foreign country, as is the Near East in general; 
however, Seierstad’s discussion of a mountain warlord in Afghanistan, and the research that 
I’ve subsequently conducted on his checkered and ultimately illustrious career, has greatly 
informed my own thinking about a family of mountain warriors that lived in Lebanon dur-
ing the second millennium B.C. 
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By the roadside about thirty men sit in a circle.  Kalashnikovs lie on the ground in front 
of them and ammunition belts are strapped over their chests…  Padsha Khan is sitting 
in the midst of them: the greatest warlord of the eastern provinces and one of Hamid 
Karzai’s most vociferous opponents.  When the Taliban fled, Padsha Khan was appointed 
governor of Paktia Province, known as one of Afghanistan’s most unruly regions.  As 
governor of an area where there was still support for the al-Qaida network, Padsha Khan 
became an important man to American intelligence.  They were dependent on coopera-
tion on the ground and one warlord was no better or worse than any other.  Padsha 
Khan’s task was to ferret out Taliban and al-Qaida soldiers.  His assignment was then to 
inform the Americans.  To this end he was supplied with a satellite telephone, which he 
used frequently.  He kept on phoning and telling the Americans about al-Qaida move-
ments in the area.  And the Americans used firepower—on a village here and a village 
there, on tribal chiefs on route to Karzai’s inaugural ceremony, on a few wedding parties, 
a bunch of men in a house, and on America’s own allies.  None of them were connected 
to al-Qaida but they had one thing in common—they were enemies of Padsha Khan… 
‘No one can own us, they can only hire us,’ the Afghan’s say about themselves and their 
rapid change from side to side in war.’2
Such a slogan might also have been bandied about by Abdi-Ashirta and his descendants in 
the hundred years or so between the mid fourteenth and mid thirteenth centuries B.C. when 
they ruled Amurru.  This polity, nestled high in the Lebanese mountain range, stretched from 
a point somewhere north of Byblos to another south of Ugarit, and from the Orontes River 
to the western foothills near the Mediterranean coast.  As can be chronicled from an archive 
of letters discovered in Egypt and an archive of treaties discovered in Hatti, the ruling clan 
of Amurru switched loyalties at a dizzying speed.  In the reign of its first historically attested 
leader, Abdi-Ashirta, Amurru paid homage (and tribute) to Egypt and to the Upper Euphrates 
Valley Kingdom of Mitanni, though apparently to each without the other’s knowledge.  His son, 
Aziru, played the rival powers of Egypt and the Anatolian kingdom of Hatti off of one another 
to good effect, but at great personal risk, before committing finally to the latter.  Abdi-Ashirta’s 
grandson and great-grandson both apparently stayed loyal to Hatti—though the Hittite treaties 
reveal Hatti’s own insecurity as to the veracity of this matter, and these are our only sources. 
The warlord’s great-great grandson transferred loyalty back to Egypt, informing the Hittite 
king: ‘We were voluntary subjects.  Now we are no longer your subjects.’3 Defeat in battle and 
the welcome prospect of being pardoned and reinstalled as ruler by a Hittite king, however, 
prompted an abrupt change of heart.  Abdi-Ashirta’s great-great-great grandson, from what we 
can tell, kept the Hittite faith.4  Rib-Hadda of Byblos, an archenemy of the first two Amurrite 
leaders once rhetorically asked an Egyptian diplomat, ‘Do not you yourself know that the land 
of Amurru follows the stronger party’ (EA 73)?5  And judging from history, his assessment of 
Amurru’s political strategy appears to have been more or less correct.
While both Padsha Khan Zadran and the rulers of Amurru paid lip service to loyalty, an 
examination of the documents concerning them demonstrates that each manipulated their 
ostensible overlords to achieve their own ends, even to the point of assassinating governors sent 
by the imperial powers to monitor their behavior.  Yet these mountain warlords for the most 
part got away with murder and with other treasonous activities, and were in fact ultimately 
rewarded for their efforts by the very governments they betrayed.  In seeking to explain the 
convergences in their narratives, this essay identifies eight structural similarities between the 
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warlords of Afghanistan and Amurru.  It also poses a series of questions of anthropological and 
political import.  How did these leaders gain such latitude to behave in ways that surely should 
not have been tolerated?  How did they construct their powerbase and maintain it, despite oper-
ating on a world stage populated by far richer and more powerful political entities?  Why did 
they court imperial intervention at the same time as they aggressively betrayed the interests of 
their overlords?  And what were the motivations of these men for playing such a dangerous game 
in the first place?  The answers to these questions illuminate at least one variant of the dynamics 
still apt to occur in polities lying outside the firm grasp of imperial control.
STRUCTURAL SIMILARITY 1:  Both Padsha Khan and the men from Amurru occupied 
rugged mountain environments, which meant that any attempt to fight them in their own 
territory would have been an extremely expensive endeavor.  
Historically, there has been no more common impediment to the extension of effective 
government than mountain ranges.  Mountains divide regions topographically and frequently 
politically as well—for those occupying valleys and mountains (to say nothing of separate valleys 
and separate mountains) may possess quite different worldviews.  It is thus not surprising that 
Afghanistan and Lebanon—countries mapped onto overwhelmingly mountainous terrain—
have been politically fractious throughout their histories and up to the present day.  The more 
formidable the barriers to regular communication and the starker the differences in socioeco-
nomic circumstances, the less apparent it is to mountain dwellers why those located in lowland 
regions should wield political sovereignty.
If it is difficult for those located in close proximity to a mountainous region to control it, 
such difficulties are amplified when outsiders attempt the task.  The British, the Russians, and 
the Americans have all sent armies of occupation to Afghanistan in recent cultural memory, 
while the foreign powers that have meddled in the politics of Lebanon are legionary.  For the 
ancient Egyptians, who sent their own soldiers to the Lebanese Mountains, the Carmel Range, 
and the Judean Hills in the Late Bronze Age, the nightmare of participating in a campaign 
launched through distant mountainous territory became something of a literary trope.  Scribal 
masters, attempting to discourage their students from romantic visions of army life, vividly 
evoked the perils of such a trek in their writings:
The narrow pass is dangerous, having Shasu-Beduin concealed beneath the bushes… 
Your path is filled with boulders and small stones without a toe hold for passage as it is 
overgrown with reeds and thorns, brambles, and ‘wolf ’s-paw.’  The declivities lie to one 
side of you, and the mountain rises on the other side of you.  With your chariot lying 
on its side, you move along swerving to and fro too afraid to pursue your horses.  If they 
are thrown toward the abyss, your horse collar is left exposed and your harness(?) falls… 
The team is exhausted by the time you locate a camping spot.  You have undergone a 
miserable experience.6
Chariots, the most vaunted military technology in the ancient Egyptian arsenal, were of 
little use—in fact were an impediment—in mountainous terrain.  Advances in technology since 
the second millennium, however, still have not solved the problem, for modern weapons of war 
have fared little better in high altitudes.  Tanks cannot ascend steep slopes and scree, while tree 
cover effectively obscures enemies from the sights of helicopter gunners and simultaneously 
offers protection to the operators of anti-aircraft missile launchers.  Indeed the unique difficul-
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ties encountered by soldiers in mountainous zones, and the recognition that some 38% of the 
world’s landmass may be classified as mountainous, evidently prompted the establishment of 
the United States Army Mountain Warfare School, which teaches soldiers through strenuous 
training—during which ‘the physical condition of the student approaches exhaustion’— how 
to function effectively in such a precipitous environment.7
Because they are so difficult of access, mountains have always attracted outlaws, dissidents, 
and others that place a particularly high premium on their political autonomy.  In mountain-
ous terrain, small forces of guerrillas can typically resist and even defeat much larger units by 
virtue of an insider’s nuanced knowledge of the environment.  Mountain passes are extremely 
vulnerable to ambushes.  Caves and forests offer excellent hiding places, and by virtue of their 
landscape, mountain strongholds possess natural fortifications far more effective than their 
intensively engineered lowland counterparts.  Today and in the past, lawless territories that lay 
beyond the control of empires and nation states lie overwhelmingly in mountainous regions. 
Padsha Khan Zadran’s province had ‘managed to resist Taliban domination just as they had his-
torically fended off other efforts by Kabul to control them… (refusing) to yield their weapons 
under the Taliban, pay taxes or allow their young men to serve in the army.’8 The same fighting 
spirit of independence that rendered Padsha Khan’s tribe valuable as anti-Taliban allies, however, 
did not bode well for their effective incorporation into a new American-friendly Afghan state 
that would also eventually require them to pay taxes and to surrender their young men to fight 
the government’s wars.  
To make matters even more frustrating from an imperial perspective, not only do mountains 
impede conquest, and mountain dwellers tend to resist it, but the spoils of such regions are also 
notoriously poor.  Mountains do not lend themselves to agriculture, and thus with a few excep-
tions, mountain societies are incapable of accumulating the type of agricultural surplus that can 
support craft specialists, significant civic investment, and other such trappings of civilization. 
Thus while the rulers of mountain polities may be immensely powerful in terms of their ability 
to wreck havoc and defy authority, these men by and large seem to adhere to the stereotype of 
the rough and ragged warlord—powerful precisely because he has so little to lose
STRUCTURAL SIMILARITY 2: Padsha Khan and the rulers of Amurru relied on two 
primary constituents for their powerbase.  Both surrounded themselves with a close cadre 
of sons, brothers, and nephews, who acted as representatives and who shared in the profits 
of their successes.  Further, beyond their clan, both relied for their fighting men primarily 
upon individuals who had been rendered rootless by years of warfare.  
When the Amarna letters for the first time illuminate the political situation in mid-four-
teenth century Amurru, Abdi-Ashirta was busy enlarging his kingdom, besieging the coastal 
cities of what would eventually become Phoenicia, as well as polities along the critical pass of 
the Biqa Valley and also neighboring cities in what is today southern Syria.  In these efforts, his 
armies were augmented by the Apiru, who will be discussed in depth shortly.  The core of his 
powerbase, however, was his immediate and extended family.  Certainly, upon Abdi-Ashirta’s 
death, which seems to have occurred at more or less the same time as Amenhotep III’s, cries 
sprang up almost immediately about the warlike activites of his sons.  These men were at first 
referred to corporately as ‘the sons of Abdi-Ashirta,’ and attested in letters by snippets such as 
‘the sons of the traitor to the king seek our harm’ (EA 100) or ‘the war of the sons of ‘Abdi-
Ashirta against me is severe’ (EA 103).  It was not long, however, before the mantle of leadership 
settled upon one son in particular, Aziru.  
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Aziru continued to draw upon the support of his brothers even after asserting his position of 
pre-eminence among them, as evidenced by the continued evocations of him together with his 
brothers and by the fact that they acted on his behalf during his absences.  As he writes to the 
king, ‘May Khan’i arrive safe and sound so that the king, my lord, can ask him how I provided 
for him.  My brothers and Bet-ili were at his service; they gave oxen, sheep and goats, and birds, 
his food and his strong drink’ (EA 161).  Further, when Aziru assures the king of his loyalty, he 
also feels compelled to add, ‘my sons and my brothers are servants of the king, my lord, forever’ 
(EA 160).  Taken together, the letters provide the impression that although succession to posi-
tions of leadership in Amurru ran along patrilineal lines, each ruler’s brothers and sons served 
as indispensible bulwarks to his power.  This impression is furthered by the Hittite treaty with 
Aziru’s son, which reads,  ‘Because your father had spoken your name before me during his 
lifetime(?), I therefore took care of you.  But you were sick and ailing.  [And] although you were 
an invalid, I nonetheless installed you [in] place of your father.  I made your […] brothers and 
the land of Amurru swear an oath to you.’9 
The other source of strength that Abdi-Ashirta and Aziru drew upon, beside the blood 
loyalty of their extended family, was their affiliation with the Apiru.  Amurru’s arch-enemy, Rib-
Hadda of Byblos, states as much in a letter to Amenhotep III, asking ‘What is ‘Abdi-Ashirta, 
servant and dog, that he takes the land of the king for himself?  What is his auxiliary force that 
it is strong?  Through the ‘Apiru his auxiliary force is strong!  So send me 50 pairs of horses and 
200 infantry that I may resist him in Shigata until the coming forth of the archers.  Let him not 
gather together all the ‘Apiru so he can take Shigat[a] and Ampi’ (EA 71).  Moreover, it is not 
only Rib-Hadda who associates the forces of Amurru with those of the oft-disparaged Apiru. 
This claim is echoed in numerous other letters from rulers in Amurru’s sphere of influence (e.g., 
EA 100, 179, 197).
The social category of Apiru was much attested in the second millennium B.C., and it is 
therefore not surprising that its definition is complex and much debated.  In general, the term 
seems to have designated rather informal, ever-shifting, and often ethnically heterogeneous 
bands of individuals who were often viewed by their settled contemporaries as dangerous ruf-
fians.10  In the aftermath of the chaos that marked the end of the Middle Bronze Age in the 
Near East, vast quantities of once-smoldering ruins and a startlingly shrunken settled population 
suggest that a great many people were uprooted from their homes due to endemic warfare, which 
only intensified as the Egyptian empire and then the Mitanni and Hittite empires extended and 
clashed.  Further, the imposition of imperial rule, even when it brought peace, often ensured 
that levels of government multiplied, such that city-dwellers and farmers now not only paid a 
tax levied by their local leaders, but they also had to support the extra weight of the imperial 
overlay.  Unsafe conditions and oppressive taxation provoked widespread popular dissatisfaction 
that led in some cases to peasant revolt and in others to flight.11 Yet another letter from Rib-
Hadda suggests that Abdi-Ashirta took advantage of such widespread disaffection to recruit for 
his cause, striking fear into the hearts of regional rulers.  ‘All the mayors long for this to be done 
to ‘Abdi-Ashirta, since he sent a message to the men of Ammiya, ‘Kill your lord and join the 
‘Apiru.’  Accordingly, the mayors say, ‘He will do the same thing to us, and all the lands will be 
joined to the ‘Apiru’’ (EA 73).  
While a proportion of Apiru pursued itinerant trades, they are most often attested in con-
temporary sources as bandits or as mercenaries.  The social category as a whole was infamous for 
being just the sort of lawless guns-for-hire that perennially plague loosely controlled conflict-rid-
den regions.  The fact that these armed refugees worked for a share of spoils, rather than out of a 
418
M o r r i s
loyalty to a particular place or to family, earned them widespread scorn from the rulers of settled 
polities.  On the other hand, some rulers hired Apiru—if only to ensure that their ready spears 
were turned outward—and would refer to their own detachments of Apiru neutrally (e.g., EA 
195).  Of all the polities attested in the Amarna letters, however, it should be stated that Apiru 
are consistently and emphatically associated with two: Amurru and Shechem.  Shechem was a 
similarly aggressive polity, located high in the Samarian Mountains, and was ruled by a leader 
whose kingdom was inherited by sons that thereafter acted corporately.  There is, therefore, a 
structural similarity in the organization of these two kingdoms, which may be of importance. 
The prevalence of the Apiru in both regions, however, likely had more to do with the tendency, 
mentioned above, for those resistant to state authority to head for the hills.
Although Abdi-Ashirta and his sons ruled their mountain kingdom many thousands of years 
prior to Padsha Khan Zadran’s ascension to power, the latter also relied heavily upon the support 
of close relatives and also of groups of disaffected fighters.  Padsha Khan, a former truck driver, 
did not inherit a kingdom from his father—although the lineage he belonged to was extremely 
powerful in the region.  Rather, the warlord’s following was built upon the basis of his reputa-
tion as a warrior during the Afghan resistance against Soviet occupation.  According to his own 
rendition of why the populace ostensibly believed that he deserved to rule over three provinces, 
he paraphrased their supposed sentiments: ‘You have been in contact with the people during 23 
years of war in Afghanistan.  You have been struggling for us.  It is your right.  There is no need 
to have three or four commanders.  You are enough.’12
Because of his ‘freedom fighting’ efforts Padsha Khan was awarded various appointments as 
governor by post-Soviet regimes, and because of his attempts to aggrandize beyond his appoint-
ed station, he was usually deposed.  He remained, however, a force to be reckoned with, largely 
because his power existed independently of the central government, although recognition from 
this authority might augment it.  A large proportion of his local power was instead due to the 
fact that the Zadrans are perhaps the most powerful clan in southeastern Afghanistan.  Thus, the 
central government has historically been eager to placate the family, often through the provision 
of revenue-producing offices in the local government.13 
Certainly, Padsha Khan relied heavily upon his many brothers, sons, and nephews whom he 
endeavored to place in positions of power.  One of his younger brothers, Amanullah Zadran, 
was awarded the position of Minister of Border and Tribal Affairs in the 2001 government, set 
up after the fall of the Taliban.  Having his brother in this office was no doubt extremely useful 
for Padsha Khan when Hamid Karzai appointed the younger Zadran to investigate any poten-
tial wrongdoings perpetrated by his older brother in his attack on the city of Gardez.14  His 
position also allowed him to produce lists for the Americans of individuals that he claimed were 
harboring members of al-Qaeda.  As early as January of 2002, however, the Americans became 
suspicious that Amanullah was using the lists to further his older brother’s efforts to consolidate 
power in Paktia province.15
Another of Padsha Khan’s brothers, Kamal Khan Zadran, served as a general in his army 
and later was deputized governor of a conquered territory (Khost) by Padsha Khan, much to 
the chagrin of the central government, whose own choice for governor was not allowed to enter 
the governor’s mansion but had to be content to occupy the guest house (Rohde 2002a).  A 
third brother, Wazir Khan Zadran served as a military commander and also as Padsha Khan’s 
mouthpiece, giving interviews on his behalf to various reporters and serving as a liaison to 
the US Special forces.16 When granting interviews himself, Padsha Khan would often be sur-
rounded by a whole cadre of nephews and cousins, who also served his interests.17  One of these 
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nephews, Jan Baz Khan, for instance, collaborated with US soldiers stationed at a base in Khost 
and provided them with intelligence and additional manpower until the veracity of his reports, 
not surprisingly, also fell under suspicion.18
Padsha Khan’s hopes for his legacy, however, may primarily have rested on the shoulders of 
his sons.  Certainly after one of his sons had been killed in a clash involving special forces, Padsha 
Khan recalled his son Abdul Wali Zadran from Dubai, where the latter had been the owner of 
a profitable automobile import-export business.  According to his own account, his father had 
ordered him: ‘’Take up the post as commander in the city of Gardez…or don’t call yourself a 
son of Badshah Khan.’  ‘I told him I didn’t want to go back to that bullet land…  I didn’t know 
what to do but to accept the orders of my father.’’19  Because Pashtun society is fiercely patri-
archal, the son owed absolute obedience to the father, and even Padsha Khan’s brother Kamal 
Khan, the general, stated of him that ‘when he sits, no one speaks without being asked first.’20 
The importance of sons, even when unwilling to fight and presumably poorly suited to it, thus 
cannot be overstated.
Nepotism, employed as a tool of governance, is not unusual.  Rulers throughout the Near 
East from the Bronze Ages through and beyond that of Saddam Hussein made (and make) 
ample use of their sons and brothers as governors, generals, representatives, and enforcers.  Such 
a system makes sense particularly in non-urban environments where family ties are typically the 
root of all allegiances.  The flipside of loyalty to one’s family and clan, however, is distrust and 
enmity toward those who do not belong and who might threaten the perquisites of the group. 
So in many cases, clan systems divide society as much as they serve to unify it.
Padsha Khan, however, did not solely rely upon his relatives but also employed the services 
of numerous Mujahedeen, newly unemployed Taliban, and others whose homes and property 
had been obliterated by decade after decade of ceaseless warfare.  A description of a skirmish 
between Padsha Khan’s forces and those of a local rival provides a good sense of the recruits that 
he—and others like him—drew upon for support and military power.  ‘Both sides, too, had 
former Taliban fighters in their ranks, inevitable in a country where men with guns reinvent 
themselves in fealty to every new power that comes along.  In terms of raw manpower, too, they 
were indistinguishable.  Both, overwhelmingly, were composed of men and boys as young as 14 
so poor they had no shoelaces, no socks, no gloves for the bitter winter cold.’21  The majority 
of Padsha Khan’s estimated force of a few thousand men was drawn from this rather tattered 
assemblage of war-torn refugees.
To tie the two threads of this study together again, one confronts, with the rulers of Amurru 
and with Padsha Khan Zadran, mountain warlords—men who carved out political polities in 
areas largely devoid of centralized control solely by virtue of the armed forces loyal to them. 
These men drew upon close clan ties to rule their realms.  Those they trusted to lead their battles 
and guard their territories were brothers and sons, cousins and nephews.  The priorities of blood 
relatives, at least in theory, could be trusted to be convergent with their own, for any success 
enjoyed by the leader would buoy the corporate unit of the extended family.  In addition, the 
rulers augmented their forces with others to whom they were not related but rather served as 
benefactors.  Often displaced and impoverished due to war, these soldiers-for-hire relied upon 
the rulers to provide them with employment in their militias.  At a time when countless other 
livelihoods were too risky (or even impossible) due to war, work as a mercenary in the service of 
such ambitious aggrandizers was only too easy to obtain.  Moreover, success in battle provided 
such rulers with a means of supporting existing forces and also—with its promise of further 
plunder—of recruiting others, thereby fuelling an ongoing cycle of violence.
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STRUCTURAL SIMILARITY 3:  Neither Padsha Khan nor the rulers of Amurru presided 
over an agricultural economy, which necessitated that funds be raised in a more creative 
manner.  In both realms, kidnapping and banditry netted the rulers a steady supply of 
ill-gotten gains, as did the capture and control of entrepots and mountain passes crucial 
to regional trade.
While Abdi-Ashirta was blessed with an easily defensible homeland and fighting men aplen-
ty, he required a steady source of income and access to grain supplies in order to support them 
and maintain his power.  Supporting a sizeable group of followers in a mountain environment 
inimical to agriculture and devoid of sought-after natural resources virtually requires the cultiva-
tion of a relationship with agriculturalists.  Such might be a peaceful relationship, based on an 
exchange of animal products for grain or—in lieu of this—the relationship might instead be 
violent and parasitical.  In the case of the polities carved out by Abdi-Ashirta and Padsha Khan 
Zadran, violence clearly served as the governing factor.  So far as it is possible to tell, Amurru’s 
economy sustained itself through booty, ransom, protection money, and the seizure of lucrative 
cities.  These latter, which ranged from small harbor depots to large population centers, such 
as Byblos, generally contained grain stores and also served as hubs for trade, so they virtually 
assured their captors of an immediate and an ever-renewable source of income.
From the letters in the Amarna archive, Amurru’s predatory nature emerges in detail.  Over 
the course of the three decades or so covered by the Amarna archive, city after city fell to 
Amurru and its allies, undoubtedly providing much in the way of material booty.  As soldiers in 
informal armies are often paid in plunder, the capture of arsenals and granaries allow supplies to 
be replenished on the spot.  The beleaguered ruler of Byblos, for instance, was routinely raided 
by Amurru at harvest time, which left his city racked with famine.  His panicky request that 
the pharaoh pay Abdi-Ashirta the thousand shekels of silver and hundred shekels of gold that 
the ‘’Apiru dog’ demanded in order to desist in his attacks, provides yet another peek into the 
Amurrite war chest (EA 91).  Considering that Aziru’s tribute to Hatti, once he was officially 
bound to this power by treaty, was only 300 shekels of gold annually,22 it is not difficult to see 
that so long as the imperial powers turned a blind eye to squabbles between their vassals, the 
tribute could be easily raised.  As it would happen, when Amurru finally did conquer Byblos, 
Rib-Hadda offered Aziru a bribe in order to restore his city to him (EA 162).  Payoffs, appar-
ently, could result from any number of scenarios. 
In such conflicts, when protection money was not paid and battle ensued, Amurru generated 
a great deal of income from the seizure of individuals.  The ruler of Qatna wrote to Akhenaten 
saying, ‘Aziru took men of Qatna, my servants, and has le[d] them away out of the country of 
my lord.  They now d[wel]l outside of the country of my lord.  If it ple[ases] him, may my lord 
send [(the ransom) money] for the men of Qatna, and may my lord ransom them’ (EA 55).  The 
ruler of Byblos also appears to have felt justified requesting fifty shekels of silver from the king 
of Egypt to ransom twelve men seized by Aziru and the other sons of Abdi-Ashirta on their 
way to staff the pharaonic administrative headquarters at Sumur (EA 114).  In cases in which 
ransom was not paid, soldiers were sold into slavery in the land of Subaru, and so the venture 
remained profitable (EA 108, 109).  It is thus interesting that when the Hittites finally drafted a 
formal treaty with Aziru, they evidently knew of his penchant for sponsoring or tolerating such 
behavior, and they inserted a clause into the treaty that made Aziru personally responsible for 
ransoming any Hittite citizen kidnapped in his realm!23
Many of the cities attacked by the Amurrites were coastal cities that served as ports of call. 
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Those who controlled them thus undoubtedly made a tidy income off of import-export duties, 
harbor taxes, docking fees, and the like.  Much to Egypt’s displeasure, both Abdi-Ashirta and 
Aziru attacked the Egyptian base at Sumur under shady, obviously trumped up circumstances, 
as will be discussed below.  For now, it is important only to explain why this small outpost was 
so attractive both to the Egyptians and to the rulers of Amurru.  Being a coastal port, Sumur 
represented a guaranteed source of income.  It possessed, however, two other charms.  First, the 
guardian of Sumur administered a substantial Egyptian granary that was evoked frequently by 
vassals in the Amarna correspondence as the source of all good things (e.g, EA 60, 85, 86). The 
desire to capture a well-stocked a grain depot in order to feed their followers no doubt moti-
vated both Abdi-Ashirta and Aziru to attack the pharaonic base, despite the fact that both men 
claimed to be faithful protectors of Egyptian interests.  Much more importantly, however, Sumur 
guarded the western end of an important pass that struck through the mountains inland to the 
city of Kadesh.  Such passes were few and far between.  Thus, whoever controlled Sumur and the 
Eleutheros Valley pass would be in a position to charge exorbitant fees to anyone who wished to 
dock in the harbor and/or to move troops, supplies, or trade-goods through the pass.
Sumur and Byblos were to Abdi-Ashirta and Aziru what Gardez and Khost were to Padsha 
Khan.  Many of the activities that brought this latter day warlord in conflict with Afghanistan’s 
central government had to do with his desire to obtain control over these two cities, both of 
which were situated on one of the most profitable trade routes with Pakistan.24  To this end, 
Padsha Khan launched numerous ultimately unsuccessful attacks against the town of Gardez and 
installed his brother, illegally, in the governor’s mansion in Khost, as was discussed above.  
From Padsha Khan’s perspective, the cities themselves were valuable as regional centers and 
hubs of trade, but the routes that linked them with each other and again with Pakistan were 
just as valuable.  The route from Gardez to Khost runs through a narrow mountain valley that, 
according to global.security.org ‘is considered extremely dangerous due to the risk of ambush.’25 
In 2002, this fifty-mile stretch of mountain road was dotted with seventeen checkpoints, and 
government documents record numerous complaints lodged by truck drivers against Padsha 
Khan’s men, who would use the checkpoints to extort money from them, at gunpoint if such 
persuasion was necessary.  One truck driver reported that if funds were not forthcoming, the 
armed men would commandeer their trucks and spirit them up to their compounds in the 
mountains.26  Indeed, this may well have been the ultimate fate of two United Nations trucks 
carrying aid supplies for civilians that Padsha Khan’s men brashly seized in 2003.27
Padsha Khan’s control of these and similar checkpoints in Gardez and along the porous 
border with Pakistan served as an irritant to the American soldiers, who wished to use the 
checkpoints themselves in order to facilitate the transport of troops and supplies and to monitor 
militants.  For this reason, they at times came into conflict with Padsha Khan and supported 
government efforts to dislodge him.  The importance of these routes is readily apparent, for even 
when the warlord’s illicit holdings were reduced to just a single checkpoint, its revenue ensured 
that he was able to rebuild his tattered forces and come back to plague the central government 
yet again.  Likewise, the attempts of one unit of Green Berets to dislodge him from a checkpoint 
led to an ambush in which a battalion chief was wounded, proving once again that in a strategic 
mountain setting, small, informal militias can indeed prevail, even against the most elite profes-
sional corps of soldiers a nation-state can muster.28 
Of all checkpoints, those that monitored the mountain passes to Pakistan were the most 
lucrative.  Just one produces thousands of dollars annually in customs fees—a fortune in 
Afghanistan.29  Further, control of such passes allowed the Zadran family to become deeply 
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involved in smuggling and in determining (no doubt often for a substantial payment) just 
which highly sought after persons or populations could be let in or out of the country—a 
subject discussed in greater detail below.30 Padsha Khan’s control of these routes may also have 
facilitated his ability to kidnap victims and thus to support his men partially through ransom, 
for the going rate for one Pakistani hostage is roughly $5,000, and kidnapping is often enumer-
ated among Padsha Khan’s many illegal activities.31  Clearly, then, in the mountainous regions 
of ancient Lebanon and modern Afghanistan the warlords operate(d) a predatory economy, rely-
ing upon their ability to extort and seize what they desired from the more prosperous lowland 
economies in their sphere of influence.  
STRUCTURAL SIMILARITY 4:  Because they pose such formidable natural barriers, 
mountains often serve as border zones between competing powers, and this certainly is and 
was true for our two case studies. 
The inhabitants of Amurru in the fourteenth century BC found themselves at the far-flung 
nexus of three competing great kingdoms: Egypt, Mitanni, and Hatti.  Amurru’s strategic value 
was appreciated by all three kingdoms, yet its distance from any of the their capital cities and its 
forbidding terrain meant that none could hope to exercise effective direct control over it.  For 
this reason, the rulers of Amurru seem to have been treated with kid gloves.  In letters to their 
respective pharaohs, Abdi-Ashirta and Aziru assume or were granted an unusually unadorned 
greeting formula—free from the more obsequious imagined prostrations—and this likely cor-
related with significant diplomatic perquisites.32  These men did not grovel in the way that the 
mayors of far richer coastal cities did, and when Amurru signed a treaty with Hatti it was on 
relatively advantageous terms.33  This lightness of imperial touch with regard to Amurru was 
undoubtedly due to the fact that each power feared the consequences for their own freedom of 
movement if Amurru was driven into firm alliance with one of their enemies.
Padsha Khan found himself in an analogous position, as his territory directly abutted the 
extremely porous border between Afghanistan and Pakistan.  The American-backed government 
in Kabul and Musharraf ’s Pakistan, however, were only two of the more important players. 
Padsha Khan also ruled over an area once ridden with Taliban, and for this reason, he attracted 
their interest as well as that of the American forces, who badly needed his help in eradicat-
ing the Taliban.  The ever shadowy Al Qaeda was also reputed to be operative in this region. 
Without the aid of local knowledge, such as that wielded strategically by the Zadran family, the 
Americans were acutely aware of their inability to distinguish former muhadjadin and members 
of local militias from Taliban or agents of Al Qaeda.34  In such a politically complex, strategi-
cally vital region, virtually all of the powers detailed above would have desired to maintain 
amicable relations with Padsha Khan. 
STRUCTURAL SIMILARITY 5:  Both Padsha Khan and the rulers of fourteenth century 
Amurru chose the strategy of playing numerous powers off of one another rather than ally-
ing themselves with one power and staying loyal.  
Being located at the loosely bounded juncture of many competing political entities and 
having their bases nestled high in regions that were notoriously difficult to conquer provided 
Padsha Khan and the men from Amurru with a certain freedom to determine their own destiny. 
It is remarkable in both cases, however, that instead of picking their own overlord, negotiating 
favourable terms, and sticking with that choice, the leaders endeavored instead to work several 
angles at once.  Pretending alliance to different, opposed political factions is a dangerous game 
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that can end badly, yet it was evidently the preferred strategy in both cases.
At the time that Abdi-Ashirta was attacking cities loyal to the pharaoh and even the phara-
onic military base at Sumur, he was ostensibly an Egyptian vassal and aggressively asserted his 
loyalty in letters to Amenhotep III (EA 60-61, 63-65).  As can be pieced together from different 
references in the Amarna archive, however, he appears also to have been a vassal of Mitanni, to 
whom he paid (or was supposed to pay) tribute in wool and purple garments, a tax that betrays 
the pastoral nature of his authorized economy and also his proximity to the murex shells of the 
Phoenician coast (EA 101).   
Given that Egypt and Mitanni were allies, there is nothing necessarily untoward about the 
two kingdoms sharing a vassal.  Moreover, the King of Mitanni’s letters to Amenhotep III are 
notoriously effusive in their expressions of affection.  Piecing together clues from the different 
letters, however, a more troubling picture arises.  There are reports from Rib-Hadda of Byblos 
that seem to imply that the King of Mitanni intended to push his border with Egypt southward, 
for he made a personal visit to Sumur and then neglected to follow through on his original intent 
to travel southward to Byblos (EA 85, 95).  Since Byblos lay well within Egyptian territory, an 
armed incursion would have been in violation of the peaceful relations between the two king-
doms, and it prompts speculation as to whether Abdi-Ashirta’s aggressive actions against Sumur 
and other neighboring Egyptian vassal cities might indeed have been launched at the instigation 
(or with the tacit approval) of Mitanni.  
Perhaps because Abdi-Ashirta had been withholding tribute, however, the relationship seems 
to have soured, for Mitanni eventually launched military assaults against Abdi-Ashirta, about 
which the latter complained to the pharaoh ‘all the [k]ing[s] under the king of the Hurri forces 
seek to wrest the lands away from my […] and…[…o]f the king, [my] lord, [but I g]uard th[em]’ 
(EA 60).  Even Rib-Hadda uncharacteristically implored the pharaoh to intervene on Amurru’s 
behalf, saying that ‘Day and ni[ght it has cri]ed to you [and they s]ay (that) what is taken f[rom 
t]hem to Mitann[a] is very much’ (EA 86).  As a result of these campaigns, Mitanni does seem 
to have succeeded in its goal to capture Abdi-Ashirta and call him to accounts—a move later 
repeated by both Egypt and Hatti in their own quite separate attempts to transform Aziru into 
a trustworthy vassal (EA 90, 162, 170).  The final chapter in Abdi-Ashirta’s story is frustratingly 
ambiguous, for it is unclear whether he died of a terrible illness (EA 95) or had been murdered 
at Mitanni’s orders because he did not produce the goods asked of him (EA 101, 124).35
If Abdi-Ashirta’s death was indeed caused by Mitanni’s anger over his lack of tribute—and 
perhaps also the perceived double-dealings that would prompt him to call upon Egypt for 
defense against the Hurrian forces—then one would think that his son would have internalized 
the message that it was safest to play by the imperial rulebook.  This is not what happened. 
Instead, Aziru picked up more or less exactly where his father had left off, paying homage and 
tribute to Egypt, but simultaneously attacking Egyptian allies and even the very same base at 
Sumur under false pretenses.  The difference this time around was that the other power that he 
chose to court was Hatti, the kingdom that had recently defeated Mitanni in battle.  Egypt’s 
relations with Hatti, however, were far tenser than with Mitanni, and no elaborate declarations 
of love masked their competing ambitions in the region.
Akhenaten, who had taken over as pharaoh, received innumerable complaints from other 
vassals about Amurrite aggression and about Aziru’s cooperation with Hittite and Pro-Hittite 
forces (e.g., EA 97, 140).  A particular sticking point was Aziru’s alliance with Aitakamma of 
Kadesh, another double-dealing vassal whose pro-Hittite leanings had become increasingly 
apparent (EA 189).  Akhenaten writes, 
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Now the king has heard as follows, ‘You are at peace with the ruler of Qidsha.  The two 
of you take food and strong drink together.’ And it is true.  Why do you act so?  Why 
are you at peace with a ruler with whom the king is fighting?…. What happened to you 
among them that you are not on the side of the king your lord?  Con[sider] the people 
that are [tr]aining you for their own advantage.  They want to throw you into the fire. 
They have lit (the fire), and (still) you love everything so very much (EA 162)!
The pharaoh also chided Aziru for avoiding his messenger.  To this charge, Aziru stated that 
he had just happened at that time to be in Tunip guarding against the looming Hittite menace. 
This unlikely excuse struck an especially hollow note when other rulers reported that what he 
really was doing in Tunip was meeting with Hittite envoys and treating them in a more splendid 
fashion than he typically treated their Egyptian counterparts (EA 161; 165)!  Examples of such 
deceit abound, but all were countered with elaborate excuses and assertions of loyalty.  ‘My 
lord, do not listen to the treacherous men that denounce me in the presence of the king, my 
lord,’ Aziru writes, ‘I am your servant forever… This is the land of my lord, and the king, my 
lord, made me one of the mayors’ (EA 161).  Indeed, to make matters more confusing to the 
Egyptians, Aziru requested in one of his letters that ‘if the king of Ha[tti] [advances] for war 
against me, the king, my lord, should give me… […] troops and chariots [t]o help me, and I 
will guard the land of the king, my lord’ (EA 157).  If the Egyptians could only have trusted 
Aziru, this request might have been reassuring.  
As will be discussed shortly, Aziru did eventually pick a side with which to align himself, 
after much duplicitous behavior.  The Hittites, however, were well aware of Amurru’s practices, 
and in the reign of Aziru’s son a treaty was drafted with its own particularized clauses. ‘You shall 
not turn your eyes to another.  Your ancestors paid tribute to Egypt, [but] you [shall not pay 
it…]  [If ] you commit […], and while the King of Egypt [is hostile to My Majesty you] secretly 
[send] your messenger to him, [or you become hostile] to the king of Hatti [and cast] off the 
authority of the King of Hatti, becoming a subject of the King of Egypt, you, Tuppi-Teshshup, 
will transgress the oath.’36  Clearly then, the Hittites did not rest easy in their assurance of com-
plete loyalty, for the reversion of Amurru to double-dealing was an anticipated complication. 
It is fascinating, then, that Amurru continually adopted this tactic, despite its proven danger 
and the extra tribute payments that it sometimes entailed.  The ever-changing intricacies of 
Amurrite loyalty have already been recited, but their own status as free agents must have been 
deemed so crucial (and so potentially profitable) that it was worth the worry.  
Like the rulers of Amurru, Padsha Khan Zadran has professed loyalty to many.  According 
to the Global Security website, 
Originally a staunch supporter of the US war against the Taliban and al Qaeda, he has so 
far proven to be beyond Washington and Kabul’s control. Zadran was an ally of Karzai 
and the United States, as well as a signatory to the 2001 Bonn agreement, but later took 
up armed opposition against the central government. His renegade forces are based in 
Paktia province.  In November 2002, US paratroopers seized an enormous cache of 
weapons and ammo—42 truckloads full—belonging to Pacha Khan Zadran. US intel-
ligence officers said that while Zadran was supposed to be a US ally, he was selling those 
weapons on the side to al-Qaeda.37 
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An even more serious charge is lodged in another Global Security report, which asserts that 
even though Padsha Khan had been on the American payroll since December 2001, ‘his troops 
stood by and let al-Qaeda terrorists escape from Tora Bora; many US military sources believed 
that Osama bin Laden himself escaped, due to the double-dealing of Bacha Khan and his com-
rades.’38
When directly charged with deception, however, Padsha Khan and his spokesmen also fash-
ioned elaborate excuses that ended up portraying the warlord as both loyal and righteous.  In 
defense of one of his relatives, who was charged by American officers with harboring a key mem-
ber of the Taliban, Padsha Khan’s brother, Wazir Khan Zadran, explained, ‘I told them, ‘You 
have chosen the wrong friends in Khost, and they have been giving you the wrong information. 
Serajuddin is no more a friend of the Taliban or Al Qaeda than you are.’’39  Misinformation, 
obfuscation, and aspersion, it appears, continue to be three of the most powerful weapons in a 
warlord’s arsenal.
STRUCTURAL SIMILARITY 6:  Both Padsha Khan and the rulers of Amurru committed 
acts against their overlords that were blatantly treasonous and unabashedly in their own 
(or in another party’s) interests.  
For an imperial government that rotates its personnel frequently, as America does and as 
the New Kingdom Egyptian government did, disentangling intricate webs of local hatreds and 
covert alliances is especially difficult.  Oftentimes, then, governments are forced to choose the 
word of one local leader over his rival.  There are cases, however, when blame for anti-govern-
ment actions can indeed be laid squarely at the feet of a particular party and where any excuses 
offered are rendered illegitimate in the face of a baldly treasonous action.
Abdi-Ashirta and Aziru launched numerous unauthorized attacks on city-states that should 
have been protected as loyal Egyptian vassals.  In this manner, no matter what excuses were 
offered, Amurru was violating the terms of its vassal status.  Of all of the many treasonous acts 
they committed, however, none was so egregious as the attacks that were launched by both of 
these men on the Egyptian base at Sumur. For the Egyptians, possession of Sumur was crucial 
to their imperial strategy as it allowed southern Syria’s main highway, the Biqa Valley, to be 
penetrated in a timely and cost-effective fashion. For Abdi-Ashirta, on the other hand, control 
of Sumur meant a substantial elevation in his own power. If the Egyptians had, in effect, to pay 
protection money to him for the continued well being of their base, and indeed for the privilege 
of access to it generally, his own personal wealth and influence in the region would be unparal-
leled.
When accused by an Egyptian official of being an enemy of Egypt (EA 62), Abdi-Ashirta 
justified his attack on Sumur by claiming that he had in fact rescued it. Similarly, he stated that 
the slaughter of the garrison had been maliciously laid at his feet by untrustworthy sources (EA 
62, see also 71, 83, 84, 91, 138).  Even to his own ears, however, this excuse must have seemed 
far-fetched.  It was not only the bold seizure of an Egyptian base that may have rankled the 
pharaoh, but Abdi-Ashirta’s subsequent actions, too, seem calculated to offend.  As Rib-Hadda 
reported, ‘Now, indeed, Sumur, my lord’s court and [h]is bedchamber, has been joined to h[i]m. 
He has slept in the bedcha[mber of ] my [lord], and opened the tre[asure] room of my [lo]rd’ 
(EA 84).  The thought that a rebel would be sleeping in the bedchamber of the pharaoh, as if it 
was his right, is especially shocking when one understands that the campaign resting places of 
the king were especially purified for this purpose.40  If a warlord’s reputation comes in part from 
his audacity—his ability to openly defy those who would seek to be his masters—one can view 
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Abdi-Ashirta’s post-conquest usurpation of royal prerogatives as a publicity stunt intended to 
shock and awe his constituents and his enemies alike.
Perhaps because of the crucial strategic nature of Sumur and because of the danger of letting 
such flagrant affronts to pharaonic power go unavenged, it appears that the Egyptians sent a 
military expedition out to confront Abdi-Ashirta and reinstate the Egyptian governor in his base 
(EA 117 and 68, 108, 138).  As will be seen to be typical in the subsequent section, however, 
Abdi-Ashirta was evidently not punished for his behavior, for he and his family continued to 
hold power.  Indeed, his son’s transgressions with regard to Sumur would appear even bolder. 
Aziru not only attacked Sumur (EA 103, 104, 106), but letters from Rib-Hadda detail his 
blockade of it by land and sea (EA 98, 105, 108-109, 112, 114, 116-117), the flight of Sumur’s 
garrison and personnel (EA 67, 96, 103, 106, 114), the murder of one Egyptian governor (EA 
124, 129, 131-132), the surrender of another (EA 132, 149), Aziru’s occupation of the ‘house 
of the king’ (EA 59) with his own troops and his chariots (EA 67), and the eventual destruction 
of the city (EA 159-160, 162).  Once again, however, the conquest of Sumur was not without 
its flourishes.  In an act of culturally specific terrorism worthy of anything perpetrated at Abu 
Ghraib, the Egyptian governor was murdered, and Aziru had his corpse flung out into the ele-
ments, denying him both burial and funerary prayers (EA 131).  The subsequent governor, a 
man who seems to have grown up at the base and was thus fully aware of the danger posed by 
Aziru, promptly ceded leadership to him (EA 132, 149).  Imperial officials, it seems, were only 
tolerated by Aziru when they acted under his authority.
Padsha Khan’s antics were no less outrageous.  Although Hamid Karzai originally awarded 
Padsha Khan governorship of his province in acknowledgement of his anti-Taliban war efforts, 
he quickly withdrew his offer when Padsha Khan besieged the capital town of Gardez that had 
barred him entry.  Following this, the warlord refused to recognize any governor sent from 
Kabul to rule over territory that he considered his.  As discussed above, the town of Khost was 
Padsha Khan’s equivalent to Sumur, and he was able to occupy the city and install his younger 
brother as governor for many months, while Karzai’s appointee was forced to occupy the gov-
ernor’s guesthouse. ‘’He sits in a room and is afraid to come out,’ said the warlord tauntingly, 
running his left hand through his thinning hair. He had removed his turban, laying it beside 
his handgun and bandoleer. ‘He is not acting as governor. All matters are controlled by me.’’ 
(Bearak 2002b).  Padsha Khan’s harsh words were not only reserved for Karzai’s governor, but 
for the Afghan President himself, ‘’He appoints one governor in the morning and another in 
the evening,’ sneered the warlord. ‘I wish he would come and fight me. He can find me in my 
barracks’’ (Bearak 2002b).   Indeed, Padsha Khan’s interventions against those governors who 
refused to act as his puppets led in 2002 to the appointment of five Governors of Paktia in as 
many months (Baldauf 2002).  It is perhaps not surprising, then, that the appointee in Khost 
was eventually assassinated under mysterious circumstances (Constable 2006).
Given that Khost lies barely 90 miles from Kabul, Padsha Khan’s continued defiance of gov-
ernmental authority—except when viewed by himself as not detrimental to his own interests—
has worried Karzai, and his activities have also aggravated the American military operative in 
the region.  The many instances in which Padsha Khan’s intelligence information was perceived 
to be false or in which key insurgents slipped over to Pakistan on his watch have already been 
mentioned.  His men also killed an American officer.  The very first American casualty in 
Afghanistan occurred because Padsha Khan’s men fired at American troops, angry that they trav-
elled under the protection of one of his rivals. ‘’It was a political matter, to force the Americans 
to switch sides,’ Mr. Gul said. ‘Padsha Khan Zadran said: ‘Why are the Americans coming 
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here without my permission? Why are they coming to Khost with Zakim Khan Zadran? Why 
are they trying to humiliate me’?’ (Burns 2002c). Hell hath no fury like a warlord slighted, the 
adage might be altered.  It should be recognized, however, that here again, the reputation of a 
man such as Padsha Khan was undoubtedly amplified according to the prestige of the power he 
openly defied.
STRUCTURAL SIMILARITY 7: Despite committing treasonous act after treasonous act, 
both Padsha Khan and the rulers of Amurru appear to have been treated lightly, even when 
physically delivered into the hands of the governments they had betrayed.  
When the strategically vital Egyptian base of Sumur was attacked and taken over by Abdi-
Ashirta, it remained in his hands for what seemed to the ruler of Byblos to be an eternity.  This 
man wrote letter after letter to the pharaoh urging him in no uncertain terms to do something 
about the situation.  ‘[W]hy have you sat idly by [and] done nothing, so that the ‘Apiru dog 
tak[es you]r cities?  [When] he took Sumur, [I wr]ote to you, ‘Why do you [do noth]ing?’ (Then 
B[it]-arq[a] was taken.)  [Wh]en he saw [that] there was no one [t]hat said anything [to h]
im about Sumur, his intentions were re[in]forced, so that he strives to take Gubla’ (EA 91, see 
similarly EA 76, 84, 88)  And, indeed, this inactivity is puzzling.  
Much the same thing happened (or rather didn’t happen) when Aziru recaptured Sumur 
following his father’s death—this despite the fact that his brazenly treasonous act was topped 
off by the murder of an Egyptian governor.  We have only stern letters from Akhenaten com-
manding him to rebuild the base, reminding him that the penalty for treason was to die by the 
axe, and accusing him of purposefully avoiding the Egyptian messenger sent to take him back 
to Egypt (EA 159, 160, 161, 162).  For a number of years Aziru successfully avoided such a 
meeting—petitioning for postponements sometimes or just happening to be away when the 
king’s messenger arrived (EA 156, 162, 164, and 165).  When Aziru finally was sent to Egypt, 
it was apparently in return for a large sum of gold (EA 169), and when he came back to his 
kingdom, he was allowed to resume leadership.  Interestingly, one letter provides the information 
that Aziru had previously been taken by Hittite authorities to Hatti and on this trip too had 
managed to maintain his grip on power (EA 162).
This pattern of stern warnings and ultimate appeasement when it came to Amurru turned 
out to be a long-standing tradition.  In the time of Aziru’s great-grandson, Benteshina, the 
Hittite king punished Amurru’s political defection to Egypt by once again capturing its ruler 
and bringing him back to Hatti.  Benteshina, like his predecessors, was ultimately re-instated on 
his throne.  In addition, he was given the honor of becoming father-in-law to one of the Hittite 
king’s sons and was himself awarded a Hittite princess to be his new chief wife (Beckman 1996: 
96-97). So, here too, disloyal activity was met with forgiveness and even the granting of favors 
rather than by retribution.  What, then, was the imperial motivation for tolerating the chroni-
cally duplicitous behavior of the Amurrite rulers?
Much of the reasoning has been discussed above.  Namely, Amurru was located in a region 
that would be extremely difficult to conquer by military means.  Moreover, even if efforts were 
successful, the booty to be reaped in the end would hardly be worth the effort.  Further, Amurru 
maintained relations with a variety of potential overlords, and Egypt presumably feared that it 
might permanently defect if pushed too hard.  Indeed, Aziru had no compunction about imply-
ing as much in his letters to pharaoh with phrases such as ‘[but i]f the king, my lord, does not 
love me and rejects me, then what a[m] I to s[a]y’ (EA 158)?  Far from an idle fear, this is exactly 
what happened, for it was only after Aziru was kept in Egypt for an unusually long time that 
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he deigned to draw up an official, binding treaty with the Hittites (EA 169; Beckman 1996: 
32-37). This move meant that Egypt lost Sumur and access to the crucial Eleutheros Valley 
transit corridor inland toward Kadesh.  The Egyptians would not regain access to either until 
they could convince Benteshina to renounce his loyalty to the Hittites in the reign of Ramesses 
II.  As we have seen, however, the Hittites responded promptly to Amurru’s defection by entic-
ing Benteshina back into their fold.
So, rather than permanently lose access to these key strategic zones, the Egyptians seem to 
have preferred to settle for at least a pretense of loyalty.  This pretense also included occasional 
shipments of ‘tribute.’  Abdi-Ashirta and Aziru sent (or claimed to be right on the verge of 
sending) women (EA 64), lumber (EA 160, 161), and other various items (EA 157, 161, 168) 
to the Egyptian court.  Indeed, it is fascinating that the rulers of the dubiously loyal moun-
tain kingdoms of Amurru and Shechem seem to have been among the most conscientious of 
Egypt’s vassals when it came to sending tribute (Na’aman 2000: 129-130).  These gifts were 
no doubt welcomed, even if a blind eye had to be turned in accepting them.  As the ruler of 
Byblos warned, ‘The king is to take <n>o account of whatever Aziru sends him.  Where are the 
things that he sends coveted?  It is property belonging to a royal mayor whom he has killed that 
he sends to you’ (EA 139).  
Regardless of the origin of the items sent as tribute, the rulers of Amurru shipped more to 
Egypt than the ever-accusatory Rib-Hadda of Byblos, who may have been less loyal than his 
endless letters asserted (EA 119 and 126)—and this brings up two important points.  First, the 
Egyptians seem to have supported both the rulers of Byblos and the rulers of Amurru, despite 
the fact that these two polities spent most of the time covered by the Amarna archive at war with 
one another.  Second, although both sets of rulers professed loyalty, neither seemed to consis-
tently act accordingly.  Thus, the Egyptian policy-makers may have come to the conclusion that 
one essentially untrustworthy ruler was as good as any other and that rather than take sides and 
risk potentially alienating one, the safer policy was to support both and to thus remain neutral 
(without seeming so) in the struggles waged between them.
Padsha Khan Zadran, like his counterparts from Amurru, openly defied his supposed 
overlords—the Afghan government and the Americans.  Further, he not only got away with this 
behavior, even when called to account for it, but was also often openly appeased.  His punish-
ment for besieging Afghan cities and impugning Karzai’s legitimacy was typically a good tongue 
lashing.  For example, after Padsha Khan’s first falling out with Karzai, the Afghan President 
publicly called him a murderer and vowed justice; however, according to The New York Times, 
Other top officials sheepishly explain that even if soldiers are sent, combat is unlikely. 
Rather than placing Mr. Zadran in handcuffs, they may merely ask for his solemn prom-
ise not to slaughter so many people at one time again.  The warlord seems to understand 
this. ‘You will see what happens,’ he said huffily. ‘They will send more delegations to talk 
to me. They know how to talk, not how to fight.’ (Bearak 2002b)
This prediction was entirely correct.  Further, as late as 2004, when Padsha Khan was 
arrested by Pakistan and handed over to Karzai’s government, Karzai left his fate in the hands 
of a delegation of elders from Padsha Khan’s own home region.  These men politely requested 
that the warlord be released. Thus, despite all of his seditious anti-government behavior, Padsha 
Khan was pardoned and asked only to provide ‘assurances that he will not do things that he has 
done in the past.’41  Indeed, instead of execution or imprisonment, Padsha Khan saw one of his 
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sons appointed district chief in southern Afghanistan.  
The Afghan and American rationales behind such lenient treatment of a chronically way-
ward vassal are much the same as they were for the Egyptians in the Late Bronze Age.  Fear that 
Padsha Khan would drop all affectations of loyalty and begin to actively work against them was a 
very real concern, proven well founded when the Americans briefly rescinded their support, and 
Padsha Khan promptly amassed 42 truckloads of weapons and ammunition to sell to al-Qaida.42 
‘As an American diplomat in Kabul put it, ‘Al-Qaeda is hunkered down waiting for an opening 
and a defection from a regional warlord could provide the cover that allow these guys to climb 
out of their holes.’ Pacha Khan Zadran may be vain, power-hungry and rebellious, but his help 
can be worth the aggravation.’43  Further, unlike most representatives sent from the capital to 
oversee the region, Padsha Khan enjoyed the legitimacy of a native son who has proven himself 
in battle.  The fact that he was at least ‘sufficiently pro-Western’ resulted in his reinstatement to 
positions of power, even when previously deposed for aggressive, self-aggrandizing behavior.44 
Classified as ‘an unsavory but necessary ally,’45 Padsha Khan was but one of many, and the 
Americans, like the Egyptians, seem to have taken the tack of supporting two opposing sides in 
a conflict, if the support of both parties was wished and neither smelled any sweeter than the 
other.  As Seierstad put it, ‘The Americans hedge their bets and work with both sides in the local 
conflict.  The Americans give both sides money; both sides accompany them on missions; both 
sides are given weapons, communications equipment, intelligence equipment.  They have good 
contacts on both sides; on both sides are former Taliban supporters.’46  Rather like a major cor-
poration that contributes political donations to both Republican and Democratic political can-
didates, so too the imperial governments sought to curry favor with rival warlords.  Such tactics, 
however, as seen in the deliberate targeting of the American officer in Khost, could backfire.
STRUCTURAL SIMILARITY 8:  The final point of similarity between Padsha Khan and 
the Amurrite leaders is perhaps the most counter-intuitive.  Namely, that despite all of their 
anti-government behavior, these rulers actively lobbied to preside as legitimate government 
officials over their territories.  Further, both actively solicited the emplacement of troops in 
their territory and competed—bloodily—with rivals for the privilege of hosting them.  
Sergeant Nathan Ross Chapman, the first casualty in the war in Afghanistan, was shot as a 
warning to the Americans not to collaborate with Padsha Khan’s rival.  The desired outcome of 
the act was that Padsha Khan and his forces would become the sole American collaborators in 
the region.  Yet given all of the covert ties between Padsha Khan and America’s enemies, as well as 
Padsha Khan’s proven desire to run his own show, such elaborate courting of the American mili-
tary seems counter-intuitive.  What would be the advantage of inviting a potentially controlling 
force into one’s own backyard?  Yet Abdi-Ashirta, while he was busy consorting with Mitanni 
and attacking fellow Egyptian vassals, actively lobbied the pharaoh to send him a pharaonic dis-
trict official, troops, and chariots.  His son too was eager to host Egyptian troops and to fulfill 
recognized positions in the Egyptian administration, despite the fact that he had a greater history 
of subverting Egyptian interests than of supporting them.
Indeed, the rulers of Amurru and Byblos, who were perennially at war, both requested that 
they be put in charge of Sumur and granted troops, horses, and chariots.  No doubt the fact 
that government bases were typically well provisioned and that government officials had rights to 
levy customs dues lay behind this request. According to Aziru’s own narrative of events, he had 
wanted to enter the service of the king, but was prevented from doing so by the corrupt officials 
that currently resided at Sumur (EA 157, similarly 171); in the same letter, he requested that 
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troops be sent to him so that he could better resist any Hittite forces that might intrude into 
his area.  Given that these missives predated his assaults on Sumur, his final ploy seems to have 
been to seize the Egyptian base for himself and then to force the Egyptians to deal with him, 
if they desired continued access.  To all indications, however, the rulers of Amurru did wish to 
continue their relationship with Egypt, for it seems to have been quite profitable.  
Abdi-Ashirta had lobbied for and received Egyptian troops (EA 70, 82), and Aziru appears 
to have been granted a garrison, provisions, as well as payments of silver and gold, much to the 
annoyance of the ruler of Byblos, who claimed that Aziru then paid the Egyptian funds to the 
Hittite king (EA 122, 126, 161).  Sumur was also the recipient of Egyptian-owned grain sup-
plies (EA 86), and if the rulers of Amurru had access to such stores, then feeding their Apiru 
dependents would be far easier.  Akhenaten himself wrote to Aziru, stating, ‘if you perform 
your service for the king, your lord, what is there that the king will not do for you’ (EA 162)? 
His question may well have been a fair one, as vassals who acted as agents for Egyptian interests 
could receive gold, silver, soldiers, grain, horses, chariots, oil, clothing, and other provisions 
(EA 70, 74, 76, 79, 85, 86, 100, 112, 125, 126, 130, 137, 138, 152, 161, 263, 287).47  These 
benefits seem to have been offered also by competing great powers, for in the Hittite treaty 
he eventually entered into, one of the clauses stipulated, ‘And if you, [Aziru, want something, 
request it] from the King of Hatti, and take [whatever the King of Hatti gives to you].’  And 
again, ‘[Now], because Aziru turned [to] My Majesty for vassalage of his own free will, I, My 
Majesty, [will send] noblemen of Hatti, and infantry [and chariotry, to him from] Hatti to the 
land of Amurru’48 
Such gifts of weaponry, men, and supplies were useful in a practical sense, especially when 
they could be deployed against personal enemies in the supposed interests of the Egyptian state, 
but they may also have carried even greater symbolic weight.  The elders of Irqata, for instance, 
requested of the king ‘may he grant a gift to his servant(s) so our enemies will see this and eat 
dirt’ (EA 100).  Like jealous, ever-vigilant siblings, Levantine vassals monitored the gifts given to 
their contemporaries closely, for such gifts of men and supplies seem to have served as tangible 
symbols of their comparatively greater access to the pharaoh’s ear and strong arm.  Indeed, the 
numbers of Egyptian personnel stationed anywhere permanently were generally token, with 30 
to 50 soldiers being deemed sufficient to quiet even a relatively troublesome area, presumably 
because a small squadron of soldiers served as a signifier of the many more that might be mus-
tered in case of an attack.  Given that virtually all centers that flourished during the Amarna 
Period were those that enjoyed pharaonic patronage, Egyptian attention evidently brought 
prosperity along with it—or at least helped foster existing prosperity.49  
Like the Egyptians, the Americans also funded key warlords in their efforts to smooth the 
way towards achieving their goals in Afghanistan, awarding them as much as $200,000 in cash 
payments (for themselves), as well as supplying their men with uniforms, ammunition, and with 
$200 per soldier per month.  By allying himself with the Americans, then, Padsha Khan could 
provide his dependents with a relatively healthy, steady income in a region where such a thing 
was rare indeed.50  Moreover, for Padsha Khan, access to American troops meant extra firepower 
against his own enemies (all terrorists, of course),51 extra ammunition in his bid for autonomy 
with respect to Karzai’s government, and extra funds to line his own pocket.  Inviting in mod-
est numbers of occupying troops also had its perks, as it did in the Levant, for from an Afghan 
perspective, even ‘small foreign forces of perhaps 100 soldiers… could prove as useful as having 
several thousand’ in terms of the symbolic weight they carried.52 
Over all of these perks of outside interference, Padsha Khan required a monopoly—hence 
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the attack on the sergeant.  Even after this shooting, however, the Americans continued to fund 
both Padsha Khan and his most hated local rivals.53  Indeed, the battle between himself and the 
man Karzai had chosen for governor of Khost was for a while played out largely utilizing revenue 
from international donors as ammunition. 
Instead of confronting Mr. Zadran with force, Mr. Taniwal hopes to bury his rival with 
cash.  Mr. Taniwal is mounting a two-pronged effort to show local residents and local 
gunmen that he has the funds from international donors to pay salaries. At the same 
time, he is trying to cut off Mr. Zadran’s access to all local government agencies that 
produce revenue.  ‘I am cutting his sources,’ Mr. Taniwal proudly announced tonight. 
‘He cannot pay his people’.54 
Connections to imperial powers, then, often could be parlayed into revenue streams that 
paid the salaries of dependents and thus boosted the numbers of men that owed a warlord (or a 
governor) loyalty.  If a warlord could himself become a governor, however, so much the better.
Holding the position of governor in an ‘illegitimate government’ that he did not respect, 
and indeed openly scorned, was ironically a continual goal of Padsha Khan Zadran’s, from his 
initial attacks on the city of Gardez in 2001 until his ascendency to the parliament in 2005.55 
Government positions not only brought in revenue, but they likewise conferred legitimacy to 
otherwise illegal actions.  Ironically enough, appeasing Padsha Khan with government positions 
for himself and his son may in fact have been Karzai’s savviest move.  After being denied in his 
bid to be governor of his district in 2001, Padsha Khan had actively opposed all ‘legitimate’ 
appointees, resulting in instability and conflict in the region.  The activities of both Padsha Khan 
and his counterparts in Amurru, then, suggest that what lay behind them was an attempt by 
these men to convince their respective overlords that no other choice for peace and prosperity 
existed in the region other than for the government to accept and sanction their own authority. 
Aziru finally received such recognition in the clauses of a Hittite treaty, while Padsha Khan, 
last glimpsed banging his fist in parliament, has been safely out of the headlines for three years 
now.  Whether such a policy of appeasement and co-option is ethical or viable in the long run 
is another matter, but without a doubt it is expedient.  
Widening the Lens
Egypt’s policies with respect to Lebanon and America’s policies with respect to Afghanistan 
are not unique.  They find parallels, for instance, in Ancient Persia and its relationship to 
Iranian pastoralists.  As Amelie Kuhrt writes, the Persian Empire accommodated  ‘considerable 
regional diversities in government and variations in the degree and nature of dependence.’  She 
continues:
The pastoralists of the great Zagros mountain chain…were never fully integrated into 
the central government system by being turned into a Persian province.  The productive 
capacities of the region were limited and it was difficult to conduct military campaigns in 
the mountainous terrain.  Further, it was hard to pin down the local population because 
they had refuges and hiding-places in inaccessible peaks and in caves.  The Persian king, 
then regularly presented local leaders with gifts, which placed the recipients under obli-
gation to help him.  The king was thus able to use their resources of manpower when 
necessary, the tribes helped to secure routes for him through the mountains, and their 
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good will meant that tribal raids on adjacent settled communities was reduced.56
Whether such local leaders were good and worthy rulers was likely outside of imperial inter-
ests in ancient Persia, as it was for the Egyptians, the Americans, and the Coalition Government 
in Iraq.  As Rory Stewart writes of the British Government’s choice for a ruler in the notoriously 
unruly marshes of Southern Iraq,
He had, it was true, probably participated in the looting of the province, profited from 
the sale of stolen ministry vehicles to the Kurdish areas, stuffed the police and the 
administration with his tribal relatives, and assaulted his political enemies, but these 
things were also true of his chief opponents and allies.57  
After reporting on Padsha Khan Zadran’s activities in Afghanistan, two New York Times 
reporters concluded pragmatically, ‘warlords make for strange bedfellows, and the American 
military has climbed under the covers with a good many of them. Expediency prevails during 
wartime.’58
As the rulers of sizable polities, men such as Padsha Khan Zadran, Abdi-Ashirta, Aziru, and 
Stewart’s Prince of the Marshes are much more complicated than mere bandits.  Yet as Brent 
Shaw and Eric Hobsbawm’s writings on bandits demonstrate, they share a good deal in com-
mon with the most successful leaders of bandit gangs.  Powerful and problematic non-state 
actors, such men and their followers are uniquely situated to exploit the productive capabilities 
of their neighbors.  Highly mobile, they inhabit inimical, agriculturally unproductive zones 
that adjacent powers are reluctant to penetrate—the ideal borderlands.59  Further, operating 
in interstitial areas, free from the shackles of the state, these men offer overburdened peasants 
and disaffected soldiers an attractive alternative to civilization, with all its discontents.  This is 
particularly so as the communities they craft flourish in violent times, when ruling governments 
are beset with social and economic crises that alienate their subjects and frustrate attempts 
to impose order.  As St. Augustine queried in City of God (4.4),  ‘Remove justice and what 
are states but gangs of bandits on a large scale?  And what are bandit gangs but kingdoms in 
miniature.’  The difference between a warlord and a freedom fighter, or between Robin Hood 
and Blackbeard, lies in the point of view of sympathizers and detractors.  To the states they act 
against such men are warlords, but they may also be paid bedfellows.
States and empires are notoriously complicated entities.  Even the most mighty—given to 
hubris—rub up at their edges against areas in which their considerable expertise and abilities 
are inadequate.  Here in these rugged and/or contested peripheries, local rulers find room to 
exercise their own agency and to exploit imperial vulnerability for their own ends in ways that 
are often far more difficult for their more firmly rooted, accessible contemporaries.  These are 
the border lands in which it is—and always has been—possible for fiercely independent aggran-
dizers, warlords fighting for their freedom, to outfox the mightiest emperors.
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